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Casenote
GRAY AREA: COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT SAYS
NEIGH TO RECONSIDERING STRICT LIABILITY IN
EQUESTRIAN SPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
  Lance Armstrong, Alex Rodriguez, Marion Jones, and Barry
Bonds are some of the most famous names in sport; however, their
notoriety is partially due to a willingness to dope to win.1  Yet, dop-
ing is not limited to human athletes.2  The 2008 Summer Games in
Beijing, China showcased incredible athletic talent.  In the eques-
trian world, six equine doping cases and the revocation of one
medal tarnished the achievements of 2008 Summer Games.3  Each
incident warranted a Fe´de´ration Equestre Internationale (FEI) Tri-
bunal Decision, and several were appealed to the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport (CAS).4
  Capsaicin was at the center of the debate, associated with four of
the six disciplinary proceedings.5  Capsaicin is “a chili pepper ex-
tract with analgesic properties” but it is used topically for pain re-
lief.6  The popular product, Equi-Block introduced the substance to
the equestrian world.7
1. See generally Mark Curriden, The Lawyer Who Took Down Lance Armstrong is on
a Mission to End the Culture of Cheating, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2014, 5:30 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/thou_shalt_not_cheat_the_lawyer_who_
took_down_lance_armstrong_is_on_a_missi (listing athletes featured in power
points condemning cheating).
2. See Jess Hallas-Kilcoyne, Equine Doping - A Global Epidemic?, HOR-
SEJOURNALS.COM (July 30, 2013), http://www.horsejournals.com/equine-doping
(detailing recent equine doping cases).
3. See 2008 Equine Anti-Doping Decisions, FEI.ORG, http://www.fei.org/fei/your-
role/athletes/fei-tribunal/2008-decisions (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter
Decisions] (listing Tribunal decisions).
4. See id. (noting that decisions involving horses Camiro, Co¨ster, Lantinus 3,
Chupa Chup and Rufus were appealed to CAS).
5. See id. (listing Capsaicin as “substance(s)”).
6. Capsaicin, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., http://pubchem.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/compound/Capsaicin#section=top (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (pro-
viding Capsaicin background information).
7. See John T. Wendt, The Crisis of Doping in Equestrian Sport, 27 ENT. & SPORTS
LAW. 10, 11 (2009) (“‘Capsaicin cases’ all have similar attributes—the use of Equi-
Block, a topical pain reliever that contains Capsaicin.”).
(457)
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  The FEI is the international governing body for equestrian sport.8
Following the infractions at the 2008 Olympic Games, the FEI
launched the Clean Sport Campaign “in response to the high-pro-
file doping cases from the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games . . . .”9
Aimed at education, the FEI endeavored to “establish the best possi-
ble system to prevent the use of methods or substances that influ-
ence the performance of a competition horse, while ensuring horse
welfare at all times.”10
  Section II of this Note establishes the relevant facts of Deutsche
Reiterliche Vereinigung e.V. v. FEI & Christian Ahlmann and Christian
Ahlmann v. FEI, beginning with a summary of the initial infraction,
subsequent FEI Tribunal decision, and finally the CAS decision.11
Section III provides a background of law and governing bodies rele-
vant to the decision, starting in sub-part (A) with an overview of
doping in American thoroughbred racing and its regulatory
scheme.12  Sub-section (B) delivers a review of the significant gov-
erning bodies in international equestrian sport.13  Section IV sum-
marizes the reasoning of the Tribunal Decision in Sub-part (A),
and Ahlmann’s legal reasoning in Sub-part (B).14  Section V dis-
cusses the inconsistency of the Tribunal’s holding with established
FEI rules.15  It then examines the ambiguities of the FEI Prohibited
Substance List (“List”) and its relation to the strict liability stan-
dard.16  Finally, it compares the legal consequences of equine dop-
8. See Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1700–1710, Deutsche Reiterliche Vereinigung
e.V. v. FEI & Christian Ahlmann and Christian Ahlmann v. FEI, award of 30 April
2009, available at http://www.centrostudisport.it/PDF/TAS_CAS_ULTIMO/
24.pdf. [hereinafter Ahlmann]. See also Structure, FEI.ORG, http://www.fei.org/fei/
about-fei/structure (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (describing FEI as “sole controlling
authority for all international events in Dressage & Para-Equestrian Dressage,
Jumping, Eventing, Driving & Para-Equestrian Driving, Endurance, Vaulting and
Reining”).
9. History of the Clean Sport Campaign, FEI.ORG, http://www.fei.org/fei/clean-
sport/h-resources/history (last visited Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter History] (describ-
ing history of Clean Sport Campaign).  Requests from competitors to clarify
doping regulations were cited as an additional reason for the campaign. Id.
10. See id. (explaining Commission’s objective).
11. For a discussion of Ahlmann’s factual background, see infra notes 19–49
and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the American thoroughbred horse racing industry’s
response to equine doping, see infra notes 50–62 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the relevant governing bodies in international eques-
trian sport, see infra notes 63–82 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of both the Tribunal and Ahlmann’s reasoning, see infra
notes 83–133 and accompanying text.
15. For a critical analysis of the reasoning of the Tribunal Decision, see infra
notes 134–140 and accompanying text.
16. For a continued critical analysis of the Tribunal Decision and Ahlmann’s
legal reasoning, see infra notes 141–155 and accompanying text.
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ing in American thoroughbred horse racing and the international
FEI context.17  Lastly, Section VI predicts the impact of the CAS
ruling in Ahlmann and comments on the durability of the strict lia-
bility standard for equine doping in the world of equestrian sport.18
II. FACTS: HORSING AROUND HAS CONSEQUENCES
  The original rule violation dispute arose at the 2008 Summer
Games in Beijing, China.19  Mr. Christian Ahlmann competed in
the Show Jumping competition with his horse, Co¨ster.20  One of
Germany’s top riders, Mr. Ahlmann was to represent Germany in
both the team and individual show jumping competitions.21  Fol-
lowing Mr. Ahlmann’s disqualification, the German team’s fifth
place finish was deemed ineligible.22  Additionally, Mr. Ahlmann
was scheduled to compete in the individual final the following week
before the positive test and subsequent disqualification.23
  Under FEI rules, Mr. Ahlmann was the person responsible (PR)
for Co¨ster during competition.24  On August 17, 2008 Co¨ster was
17. For a continued critical analysis of the Tribunal Decision and Ahlmann’s
legal reasoning, see infra notes 157–167 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of the decision in Ahlmann, see infra notes
168–190.
19. See Ahlman, supra note 8 at para. 2 (recounting equestrian competition
took place in Hong Kong).
20. See id. (acknowledging Mr. Ahlmann was member of 2004 German Show
Jumping team in Athens whose medals were revoked due to prohibited substance
violation).
21. See Doped Horses Mar Olympic Equestrian Competition, DW.COM (Aug. 21,
2008), http://dw.com/p/F29n (lamenting effects of equine doping on 2008
Olympic games).
22. See Ahlmann Among Five Riders Banned, ESPN.COM (Aug. 14, 2009), http://
sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/story?id=4399442 (reporting effect of Mr. Ahl-
mann’s disqualification).
23. See Doped Horses Mar Olympic Equestrian Competition, supra note 21 (noting
Mr. Ahlmann’s ineligibility for individual final).
24. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 2. See also Fe´de´ration Equestre Internatio-
nale, Decision of the FEI Tribunal – Coster, at 2, 2008 [hereinafter Tribunal Decision],
available at http://www.fei.org/system/files/20%20-%20COSTER%20-%20Tribu
nal%20Decision%20-%2022%20October%202008.pdf (explaining Mr. Ahlmann
was person responsible (“PR”) because he was rider at event); FE´DE´RATION EQUES-
TRE INTERNATIONALE, Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication Regulations, Pref-
ace, 1 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter EADCM Regulations], available at https://www.
fei.org/sites/default/files/2016%20EADCMRs%20-%20Effective%201%20January
%202016%20-%20Clean%20Version_0.pdf (indicating persons responsible “re-
main[ ] ultimately . . . liable, for EADCM violations”).  The person responsible is
“responsible for any [b]anned [s]ubstance found to be present in their [sic]
[h]orse’s [s]amples.” FE´DE´RATION EQUESTRE INTERNATIONALE, Equine Controlled
Medication Rules, art. 2.1, at 4 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ECM Rules] (emphasis
omitted).
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tested by FEI officials after the Team Final.25  The laboratory tested
Co¨ster’s blood and urine the following day; both tested positive for
Capsaicin.26  The FEI prohibits Capsaicin because of its pain reliev-
ing and hypersensitizing effects.27  The FEI “provisionally sus-
pended” Mr. Ahlmann following the notification of a positive test.28
Provisional suspensions are temporary bans from competition fol-
lowing an Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication
(“EADCM”) Regulation violation.29  On August 21, 2008, a prelimi-
nary panel of the FEI Tribunal found the positive test results suffi-
cient in light of Mr. Ahlmann’s inability to explain the presence of
the prohibited substance and did not alter his suspension.30  The
FEI then tested the B sample to confirm results.31  On August 22,
2008, the B sample test confirmed the existence of Capsaicin in
Co¨ster’s samples.32  On August 24, 2008, Mr. Ahlmann explained in
a press release that he had been treating Co¨ster’s back pain by ap-
plying Equi-Block during the summer.33  Mr. Ahlmann treated Co¨s-
ter without researching the product or consulting the team
25. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 2 (reporting test).
26. See id. (reporting results).  Co¨ster’s veterinarian submitted two forms re-
questing authorization for use of saline and emergency treatments with prohibited
substances, both of which were granted.  Id. Capsaicin was not mentioned on ei-
ther of these forms. Id. at paras. 3–4.
27. See id. para. 21 (explaining ban).  Capsaicin has both pain relieving and
hypersensitizing properties, which make it subject to FEI regulation. Id.
28. See id. para. 3 (suspending Mr. Ahlmann for prohibited substance in Co¨s-
ter’s A sample).
29. See EADCM Regulations, supra note 24, Preface, at 1 (defining provisional
suspension). A provisional suspension is
a consequence of an EADCM Regulation violation or admission whereby
the [p]erson [r]esponsible and/or member of the [s]upport [p]ersonnel
and/or a [h]orse is barred temporarily from participating in any capacity
in a [c]ompetition or activity or being present at an [e]vent (other than
as a spectator) that is authorised or organised by the FEI or any National
Federation or at [c]ompetitions authorised or organised by any interna-
tional- or national-level [e]vent organisation prior to the final [d]ecision
at a hearing conducted under Article 8 (Right to a Fair Hearing).
Id.  See also id. art. 7.4.1, at 12 (detailing when provisional suspensions are
warranted).
30. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 3 (reporting sufficiency of test and refus-
ing to lift provisional suspension).
31. See EADCM Regulations, supra note 24, art. 2.1, at 1 (explaining proce-
dure for B sample analysis).
32. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 3 (reporting sample B positive test). See
also EADCM Regulations, supra note 24, art 2.1, at 2 (explaining the person re-
sponsible may request to have B sample analyzed).
33. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, at para. 6 (describing Mr. Ahlmann’s explana-
tion). See also Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at12 (describing press release).
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veterinarian.34  Equi-Block’s packaging explicitly warns that the
product contains Capsaicin.35  Equi-Block is a topical pain reliever
widely used in the competitive equestrian world despite its prohib-
ited status.36
  Following a hearing on September 26, 2008, the FEI Tribunal
found that Mr. Ahlmann committed a Medication Class A offense.37
First, the Tribunal accepted the positive results reported by the
Hong Kong Jockey Club Racing Laboratory.38  Finding sufficient
proof of an offense under the EADCM Regulations in Article 3, the
Tribunal next considered whether the offense was an anti-doping
or medication control violation.39  In finding a medication control
violation, the Tribunal rejected the FEI’s contention that the viola-
tion was both an anti-doping and a medication control violation.40
The Tribunal reasoned that the language of the rules stipulated
that only one of the violations may occur in a single incident.41  Ad-
ditionally, the FEI must prove that the substance was used to “influ-
ence performance” beyond its “mere existence.”42  However, “Dr.
Farrington clearly stated that there was no proof of a hypersensitiza-
tion of the [h]orse’s legs . . . .”43
  Next, the Tribunal explained that the strict liability standard ap-
plicable to medication control rule violations, citing fairness as a
34. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 22 (suggesting Mr. Ahlmann should have
consulted a veterinarian). See also Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 15 (“[Mr.
Ahlmann] was negligent to a material extent in using Equi-Block on the [h]orse’s
back . . . apparently without seeking veterinary advice.”).
35. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 3 (“It is undisputed that [Equi-Block]
contains Capsaicin.”).
36. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 13 (reporting Equi-Block is “com-
monly available”).
37. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, paras. 1, 3–4 (reporting findings). See also
EADCM Regulations, supra note 24, art. 2.1.3, at 2 (“[T]he presence of any quan-
tity of any [b]anned [s]ubstance . . . in a [h]orse’s [s]ample shall constitute an
EAD [Equine Anti-Doping] rule violation.” (emphasis omitted)).
38. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 7 (accepting lab results).  “The
Tribunal is satisfied that the laboratory reports relating to both the A-Sample and
B-Sample reflect that the analytical tests were accurately performed in an accept-
able method and that the findings of HKJC are accurate.” Id.  Further, the Tribu-
nal dismissed Mr. Ahlmann’s methodology objections. Id. at 7–8.
39. See id. at 8–9 (accepting objective elements of offense and deciding type
of offense committed).
40. See id. at 9 (“The Tribunal does not accept the FEI’s position on this
point . . . .”).
41. See id. (noting text “uses the word ‘OR’ and not ‘AND’”).  The FEI was not
able to meet its burden of proof for an anti-doping violation under EADCM Regu-
lations Art. 3.1 because the language indicates a single offense may only qualify as
either a medication control rule violation or an anti-doping violation. See id.
42. See id. at 10 (describing burden of proof).
43. Id. (reporting no proof of hypersensitivity).
5
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key consideration for strict liability in equestrian sport.44  Finally,
the Tribunal suspended Mr. Ahlmann for four months, fined him
CHF (“Swiss Franc”) 2,000, and ordered his contribution of 1,500
Swiss Franc for “legal costs.”45  Mr. Ahlmann completed his four-
month suspension from competition on December 19, 2008.46
  On November 13, 2008, the Deutsche Reiterliche Vereinigung (Ger-
man National Federation) appealed to the CAS seeking to increase
Mr. Ahlmann’s penalty.47  Ultimately, the CAS found that Mr.
Ahlmann committed an anti-doping rule violation.48  The CAS im-
posed an eight-month period of ineligibility and a fine of 2,000
Swiss Franc.49
III. BACKGROUND: HORSE SENSE IN GOVERNING EQUINE SPORT
A. A Horse of a Different Color: Doping in
Thoroughbred Racing
  According to a New York Times report, twenty-four horses die on
racetracks every week in America.50  In an investigative series, enti-
44. See id. at 11 (arguing that “strict liability regime has been confirmed on
numerous occasions”).  “The FEI has a strict liability policy in regard to competing
with prohibited substances present in the horse’s system at international events.”
Id.  Further, the Tribunal found “the substance is part of the [M]edication A
list . . . assumptions regarding the meaning of the concentration detected and its
effects on the [h]orse are irrelevant as to the decision that there has been a rule
violation by the PR.” Id. at 12. See also EADCM Regulations, supra note 24, art
2.1.1, at 2 (establishing strict liability for FEI Equine Anti-Doping Rules).  “It is not
necessary that intent, [f]ault, negligence or knowing [u]se be demonstrated in
order to establish an EAD [Equine Anti-Doping] Rule violation under Article 2.1.”
Id. (emphasis omitted).
45. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 4 (detailing Tribunal ruling).
46. See id. (describing Mr. Ahlmann’s suspension service).
47. See id. para. 5 (reporting relief sought).  The German National Federation
requested the following penalty increase:
(1) The PR shall be declared ineligible for a period which the Panel
deems appropriate for [d]oping [p]rohibited [s]ubstances but no less
than eight (8) months, which period shall commence on the date of the
application of the provisional suspension, 21 August 2008;
(2) The PR shall be fined CHF 2000; and
(3) The PR shall contribute CHF 1500 towards the legal costs of the judi-
cial procedure (of the FEI Tribunal).
(4) The FEI and the PR shall jointly and severally bear the costs of this
arbitral proceeding and contribute an amount to the legal costs of the FN
according to article R64.5 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration . . . .
Id.
48. See id. para. 21 (reporting CAS findings).
49. See id. paras. 22–23 (announcing ineligibility and fines).
50. See Walt Bogdanich, Joe Drape, Dara L. Miles & Griffin Palmer, Mangled
Horses, Maimed Jockeys, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
03/25/us/death-and-disarray-at-americas-racetracks.html?pagewanted=all (report-
ing prevalence of drug use in U.S. racing industry). See also Joe Drape, Lawsuit
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tled “Breakdown: Death and Disarray at America’s Racetracks,” the
Times chronicled the declining thoroughbred racing industry in the
United States, revealing shocking facts about equine drugging, lax
enforcement, and deadly consequences.51  Scholarly articles have
echoed similar concerns, blaming widespread equine doping in
thoroughbred racing on inconsistent regulation and skewed eco-
nomic incentives.52  Legal inconsistency and careless enforcement
characterize the regulatory scheme.53  Governed by individual
states, trainers and others tasked with the well-being of equine ath-
letes are subject to a dizzying array of laws and enforcement
policies.54
  The media spotlight beamed directly on the issues of equine
safety and doping on the racetrack in 2008 when a filly, Eight
Sheds Light in Use of Legal Medications in Horses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/sports/06horse.html (“[T]he United States has
the world’s worst mortality rate for thoroughbreds.”).
51. See Megan Louttit, John Niedermeyer & Josh Williams, Breakdown: Death
and Disarray at America’s Racetracks, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2012/04/30/us/breakdown-horses-series.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2012)
(describing current state of overmedication and doping in thoroughbred racing).
The series explores the economic, scientific, personal, and societal factors contrib-
uting and arising out of the decline of thoroughbred racing in America. See id.
One story hypothesizes that the combination of lax enforcement and economic
downturn has increased prevalence of illegal drug use in equines at the racetrack.
See Bogdanic, Drape, Miles & Palmer, supra note 50.
52. See, e.g., Amy L. Kluesner, And They’re Off: Eliminating Drug Use in Thorough-
bred Racing, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 300–02 (2012) (discussing common-
ness of doping and inconsistency of state regulation); Luke P. Breslin, Reclaiming
the Glory in the “Sport of Kings”—Uniformity is the Answer, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 297, 299–300 (2010) (citing medication abuse and state-by-state regulation
as key issues).  “The influx of money has caused many stakeholders and other
members of the industry to compromise the health and safety of the racehorse by
supplementing the typical hay and oats diet with performance-enhancing drugs
and abuse of medications.” Id. at 299 (footnote omitted); Bradley S. Friedman,
Oats, Water, Hay, and Everything Else: The Regulation of Anabolic Steroids in Thorough-
bred Horse Racing, 16 ANIMAL L. 123, 140–51 (2009) (discussing anabolic steroid
doping and citing betting profits, regulation difficulties, and enforcement compli-
cations as reasons for doping prevalence); Kimberli Gasparon, The Dark Horse of
Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering Performance-Enhancing Drugs to Racehorses, 16
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 199, 201–03 (2009) (describing multiple agencies in-
volved in regulation and lamenting low penalties that fail to deter money-hungry
trainers and veterinarians).
53. See Kluesner, supra note 52, at 302 (noting “lax enforcement” and incon-
sistent penalties). See also Alexandra D. Logsdon, Unbridled “Spirits”: An Integrated
Analysis of the Law, the Science, and the Future of Thoroughbred Medication, 6 KY. J.
EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 141, 149 (2014) (pinpointing lack of centralized
regulatory body as “major source of the doping problem in the United States”).
54. See Gasparon, supra note 52, at 204 (considering second offenses where a
Kentucky trainer could receive three to five year suspensions, while Maryland
trainer could receive number of potential sanctions based on discretion). See also
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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Belles, had to be euthanized on live television after sustaining two
broken legs in the Kentucky Derby.55  Shortly after the tragedy, the
trainer of the winning horse bragged about administering steroids
to his horse before the race to enhance his performance.56  In re-
sponse to recent media attention from high profile equine deaths,
various stakeholders have gathered to prioritize equine health.57
  In the legal realm, courts have consistently held that trainers are
responsible for any positive drug test, applying strict liability.58  Also
called the absolute insurer rule, the trainer responsibility rule has
been consistently upheld as constitutional, barring one exception.59
However, at least one commenter has argued the rule is not just
“occasionally . . . harsh and unfair . . . [but it] is very under inclusive
[sic].”60  Accordingly, the commenter advocates for a more flexible
rebuttable presumption rule, implemented in several states, that al-
lows trainers to present evidence of innocence after a positive test.61
55. See Friedman, supra note 52, at 123 (detailing horrific incident which
highlighted devastating effects of doping in horseracing).
56. See id. at 123 (describing trainer’s claim). See also Jennifer M. Jabroski,
Reining in the Horse Racing Industry: A Proposal for Federal Regulation of Steroid Use in
Racehorses, 1 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 67, 67–68 (2009) (noting steroid
use was legal).  This finding promoted public discussion on safety and medication
use in horseracing. Id.
57. See Kluesner, supra note 52, at 306 (identifying genetics and over-medica-
tion as oversight priorities).  The Welfare and Safety of the Racehorse Summit,
held in 2008, recommended eight improvements including “establish uniform reg-
ulation,” “reduce catastrophic injuries,” and “encourage responsible thoroughbred
ownership.” Id.  See also Breslin, supra note 52, at 317–18 (arguing concern for
equine health and safety should be paramount).
58. See Bennett Liebman, The Trainer Responsibility Rule in Horse Racing, 7 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2–5 (2007) (citing Hudson v. Tex. Racing Comm’n, 455 F.3d
597, 601 (5th Cir. 2006)) (holding rule reasonable to promote state interest in
ensuring equine health, promoting integrity of sport and protecting public).  The
trainer responsibility rule originated with the Florida Racing Commission in the
mid-1930s. Id. at 6–10.
59. See Liebman, supra note 58, at 10–21 (detailing cases challenging absolute
insurer rule’s constitutionality).  Only one court found the rule unconstitutional,
holding that the rule was “arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. at 19.  However, Hud-
son v. Tex. Racing Comm’n declined to follow the reasoning of this court. Id. at 4.
60. See Liebman, supra note 58, at 36 (arguing that rule should be elimi-
nated).  For further discussion of this argument, see infra note 61 and accompany-
ing text.
61. See Liebman, supra note 58, at 21 (detailing several cases applying rule).
Courts in New York, Kentucky, Colorado, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Illinois
have upheld the rebuttable presumption rule as constitutional. Id. at 21–23.  This
rule would place the burden of proof upon the trainers, however he or she would
remain liable if the evidence is not sufficient. Id.  Additionally, this rule allows the
possibility of finding of innocence, unlike the imposition of strict liability. Id. at
24.  See also Barchi v. Sarafan, 436 F. Supp. 775, 783–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev’d in
part sub nom. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1978) (holding New York rebuttable
presumption rule constitutional); Wetzel v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Bd., 487
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Additionally, it seems the endorsement of strict liability for horse
trainers is inconsistent with traditional applications of strict
liability.62
B. Unbridled Authority: Regulation of International
Equestrian Sport
  The European Sports model is based on a pyramid structure.63
The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) is the governing
body of the Olympic games pursuant to the Olympic Charter.64  In-
ternational Federations (“IFs”) regulate individual sports under
Olympic Committee standards.65  The FEI is the international gov-
erning body of equestrian sport.66  Operating under the IFs are the
National Federations (“NFs”), which regulate a particular sport
within one country.67  In the world of equestrian sport, the FEI ex-
ercises complete authority over its national federations.68  The FEI
N.Y.S.2d 218, 219–20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (annulling trainer responsibility for
doping offense).
62. See Liebman, supra note 58, at 24–33 (detailing areas of law where courts
have embraced strict liability).  Strict liability is applied in tort law under ultra-
hazardous activities, strict product liability, and “dram shop laws,” or laws imposing
strict liability on tavern keepers for serving alcohol to minors or the over imbibed.
Id. at 27–30.  Additionally, courts have endorsed strict liability in limited criminal
cases such as public welfare offenses or morality crimes. Id. at 30–33.  However,
these endorsements lack commonality with the absolute insurer rule. Id. at 33.
The absolute insurer rule does not broadly protect safety like the tort laws nor does
it protect public morals like the criminal laws. Id.
63. See James A. R. Nafziger, European and North American Models of Sports Or-
ganization, in HANDBOOK ON INT’L SPORTS LAW 88, 90 (James A. R. Nafziger & Ste-
phen F. Ross eds., 2011).
64. See James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law, in HANDBOOK ON INT’L
SPORTS LAW 1, 7 (James A. R. Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds., 2011) (describing
governing body).
65. See Holly Rudolph, Note, Horse Sense and High Competition: Procedural Con-
cerns in Equestrian Doping Arbitration, 2 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NATURAL RES. L. 47,
49 (2010) (explaining FEI is IF for equestrian sport).
66. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, at paras. 2, 4 (recognizing FEI as chief gov-
erning body). See also Structure, supra note 8 (describing FEI as “sole controlling
authority for all international events in Dressage & Para-Equestrian Dressage,
Jumping, Eventing, Driving & Para-Equestrian Driving, Endurance, Vaulting and
Reining”) (emphasis omitted).
67. See Nafziger, supra note 63, at 91 (describing international sports model).
68. See FE´DE´RATION EQUESTRE INTERNATIONALE, STATUTES, art. 2.6 (23d ed.
2014), [hereinafter Statutes], available at http://www.fei.org/sites/default/files/
Statutes%2029%20April%202014%20-%20clean_NEW%20FORMAT_FLI_4
May14.pdf.  The Statute explains:
The National Federations agree to comply with, and be bound by, the
Statutes, General Regulations, Sport Rules and any [d]ecision issued by
the authorised bodies of the FEI in relation to the conduct of interna-
tional equestrian [e]vents, all of which shall also bind [o]rganising
[c]ommittees, [o]fficials, [h]orse [o]wners, [p]ersons [r]esponsible,
9
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Tribunal decides cases involving violations of FEI rules.69  Following
a Tribunal decision, disputes may be appealed to the CAS.70
1. The CAS
  The CAS is an independent arbitration body exclusively devoted
to resolving disputes in sport.71  Established by the International
Olympic Committee in 1983, CAS has since become a completely
independent organization.72  As a result of the World Anti-Doping
Agency (“WADA”) Code, the CAS has become the premier venue
for resolving doping disputes.73  The CAS is subject to review by the
Swiss Federal Tribunal, but only in limited circumstances.74  The
[a]thletes, team officials and other individuals and bodies involved in FEI
Events.
Id.
69. See Statutes, supra note 68, art. 38.1 (explaining Tribunal decision-making
factors).  The Tribunal decides cases on:
(i) [a]ny infringement of the Statutes, General Regulations, Sport Rules,
or Procedural Regulations of a General Assembly or of violation of the
common principles of behavior, fairness, and accepted standards of
sportsmanship, whether or not arising during an FEI meeting or [e]vent;
(ii) [a]ny issue of interpretation of the Statutes, General Regulations, and
Sport Rules . . . .
Id.
70. See Statutes, supra note 68, art. 39.1 (“The Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS) shall judge all [a]ppeals properly submitted to it against [d]ecisions of the
FEI Tribunal, as provided in the Statutes and General Regulations.”).
71. See Richard H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in HANDBOOK ON
INT’L SPORTS LAW 32 (James A. R. Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds., 2011) (defining
CAS).
72. See id. at 32–33 (explaining independence of CAS).  The Tribunal held
that the CAS was sufficiently independent and impartial to meet Swiss Arbitration
standards. Id. This landmark case initiated reform in the CAS, including the crea-
tion of the International Council for the Arbitration of Sport (ICAS) to organize
the financial and administrative obligations of the CAS. Id.  The case solidified the
independence of the CAS from its founding sponsor, the IOC. Id.  See also History
of the CAS, TAS/CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-
the-cas.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (describing Gundel’s appeal as impetus for
change causing CAS reform).
73. See McLaren, supra note 71, at 34 n.11 (“WADA Code makes CAS the ap-
peals body for all international doping relegated disputes.”).
74. See id. at 34 (stating CAS is “subject only to the oversight of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal under Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International
Law”). See also Frequently Asked Questions, TAS/CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/
general-information/frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2015)
(“Judicial recourse to the Swiss Federal Tribunal is allowed on a very limited num-
ber of grounds, such as lack of jurisdiction, violation of elementary procedural
rules (e.g. violation of the right to a fair hearing) or incompatibility with public
policy.”).
10
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Swiss Tribunal has only overturned a handful of CAS decisions
since it began hearing cases in 1984.75
  The CAS Code, which governs the Tribunal, explains the CAS has
jurisdiction where “parties have agreed to refer a sports-related dis-
pute to CAS . . . [which] may arise out of an arbitration clause con-
tained in a contract[,] . . . ordinary arbitration proceedings . . . [or]
an appeal against a decision rendered by a federation . . . .”76  In
addition to offering both ordinary arbitration and appeals arbitra-
tion, the CAS also issues advisory opinions and offers mediation.77
2. FEI’s Clean Sport Campaign
  The FEI launched the Clean Sport Campaign in November 2008
in response to a number of doping cases at the Beijing Olympics.78
In an attempt to clarify and harmonize doping rules, the Clean
Sport Commission (“Commission”) and later, the Stevens Commis-
sion, focused on specific and broad doping issues respectively.79
The Commission chaired by Arne Ljungqvist, the sitting Vice Presi-
dent of the WADA, produced Prohibited Substance Lists for human
and equine athletes as well as EADCM Regulations.80  Under
Ljungqvist’s leadership, the Clean Sport campaign sought to bring
the FEI “in line with the WADA Code.”81  Launched as an educa-
tional campaign, the Commission “represented a united effort of all
stakeholders . . . to clarify doping protocols in equestrian sport.”82
75. See McLaren, supra note 71, at 38 n.42 (reporting first overturned CAS
decision). See also MARK JAMES, SPORTS LAW 63-66 (2d ed. 2013) (detailing cases
where CAS was overturned).
76. TAS/CAS, Code: Procedural Rules, at R27 (2013), available at http://
www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/CAS_Code_2013_en.pdf (explaining ap-
plication of procedural rules).
77. See McLaren, supra note 71, at 39.
78. See History of the Clean Sport Campaign, FEI CLEAN SPORT CAMPAIGN, http://
www.feicleansport.org/history.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (detailing history of
clean sport campaign).
79. See id. (describing Clean Sport Campaign history).  Several working
groups were created: Laboratory, Legal, List, and Communications & Education.
See id.
80. See id. (noting Commission was set up in November 2008 and reporting
documents produced).
81. Independent Commission Urges New Measures to Clean Up Equestrian Sport,
DRESSAGE-NEWS.COM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.dressage-news.com/?p=3202
(describing new leadership direction).
82. See Wendt, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing FEI response to Beijing doping
cases).
11
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: THE MANE EVENT
A. FEI Tribunal
  In the FEI Tribunal Hearing, the panel underwent a three-step
analysis when sanctioning Mr. Ahlmann.83  The Tribunal spent a
significant portion of the opinion discussing the legitimacy of the
strict liability standard.84  The following subsections will focus on
the three steps addressed by the panel: positive findings, type of
rule violation, and sanctions.
1. Positive Findings
  Both Co¨ster’s A-sample and B-sample tested positive for Capsai-
cin, satisfying the panel’s proof standard.85  Mr. Ahlmann argued
that the laboratory’s Capsaicin sample, used as a reference point,
was expired and therefore void.86  Despite the laboratory methodol-
ogy protests from Mr. Ahlmann, the panel ultimately accepted the
test results.87
2. Type of Rule Violation
  Next, the panel analyzed whether Mr. Ahlmann committed a dop-
ing or medication rule violation.88  First, it determined that Capsai-
83. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 11 (reporting panel’s sanctioning
analysis).
84. See id. at 11–12 (advocating strict liability standard in sport).
85. See id. at 7–8. See also EADCM Regulations, supra note 24, art. 3.1, at 4.
The section entitled “Proof of EAD Rule Violations, Burdens and Standards of
Proof” provides:
The FEI shall have the burden of establishing that an EAD Rule violation
has occurred. The standard of proof shall be whether the FEI has estab-
lished an EAD Rule violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the
[h]earing [p]anel bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation
which is made. This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere
balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Where these EAD Rules place the burden of proof upon the [p]erson
[r]esponsible . . . to rebut a presumption or establish specified facts or
circumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance of probability,
except where a different standard of proof is specifically identified.
Id.
The EADCM Regulations provide an identical Burden and Standard for
proof for ECM (Equine Controlled Medication) violations. Id.
86. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 7 (describing use of expired Cap-
saicin sample may discredit laboratory).
87. See id. at 8 (accepting Dr. Wan’s response that expired Capsaicin claim was
meritless).  Under EADCM Regulations Article 3.2.1, FEI Laboratories “are pre-
sumed to have conducted [s]ample analysis and custodial procedures in accor-
dance with the FEI Standard for Laboratories.” Id. at 7.
88. See id. at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing possible
violations).
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cin is “not a normal nutrient for the horse” and thus may have been
used medicinally.89  The Veterinarian Report offered three hypoth-
eses for how Capsaicin could be used topically, two of which would
have resulted in a medication rule violation and one that would
result in a doping violation.90  The FEI argued that the use of Cap-
saicin constituted both a doping violation and a prohibited sub-
stance violation.91  The panel rejected the doping violation
argument, stating that “[t]here is no indication [in the rules] that
the presence of the substance already implies the use as a hypersen-
sitizing agent.”92  The Panel focused on the wording of the EADCM
Regulations, arguing that regulatory language limited FEI to estab-
lishing a doping violation or a medication control violation, not
both.93  Further, a doping substance is defined as a substance “likely
to have been applied to body parts or to tack to influence
performance.”94
  The Tribunal dismissed the possibility of categorizing Capsaicin
as a medication class B substance without significant explanation.95
89. See id. at 8 (describing reasons why Capsaicin would appear in equine
drug test).
90. See id. at 8–9 (explaining Capsaicin use theories).  The three theories of
Capsaicin use offered by the Veterinarian Report were:
[Capsaicin] may be used medicinally by topical application in three ways:
1) to reduce the pain of arthritic joints and soft tissues; 2) on the digital
nerves into the foot to desensitise those nerves in horses with foot pain;
3) to the front of the legs, “to produce a burning sensation to unduly
sensitise the limb(s) to touching poles to make the horse more careful in
its jumping efforts thus improving performance.”
Id. at 8.  Under use one or two, the person responsible could have requested per-
mission to continue application with a medication form.  If the proper form were
not filed, either of these uses would be under Prohibited Substances Medication
Class A.  Under use three, this application would constitute an anti-doping offense.
Id.
91. See id. at 9 (explaining Capsaicin may qualify as either type of offense
because it has both hypersensitizing and pain relieving properties).
92. Id. at 10 (explaining rejection of doping violation argument).  The FEI
was not able to prove hypersensitization. See id.  The panel noted that “there was
no proof of a hypersensitization of the [h]orse’s legs, even though the legs of all
horses including the [h]orse [Co¨ster] had been checked by the [e]vent officials
after each competition round.” Id.
93. See id. at 9–10 (determining EADCM Regulations Article 3.1 only permits
establishment of one violation).  EADCM Regulations Article 3.1 provides that
“[t]he FEI shall have the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule violation
or medication control violation has occurred.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks emitted).
94. Id. at 10 (defining doping substance).
95. See id. (stating Tribunal could not “accept that Capsaicin can also be con-
sidered as a medication B substance.”).  The Tribunal did not elaborate. See id.
13
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Thus, the violation constituted a Medication Class A violation be-
cause the FEI was unable to prove a doping offense.96
3. Sanctions
  The panel considered a variety of factors when sanctioning Mr.
Ahlmann.97  In an effort to maintain fairness, the FEI considered
both mitigating and aggravating factors.98  Although Mr. Ahlmann
had no prior rule violations and had already been punished by dis-
qualification from the event, the Tribunal in contrast evaluated his
status at the top of the sport and the nature of the substance.99
Ultimately, the panel sanctioned Mr. Ahlmann for four months and
imposed two fines.100
B. The CAS
  In Ahlmann,101 the CAS upheld the appeal of the German NF
against the FEI Tribunal and modified Mr. Ahlmann’s sanctions,
increasing his period of ineligibility.102  The CAS spent a significant
portion of the opinion on explaining and evaluating the merits of
the violation.103  The following subsections will focus on the CAS
decision-making process: procedural matters, merits, and sanctions.
1. Procedural Matters
  First, the CAS established jurisdiction under the FEI Statutes.104
The German NF has standing to file an appeal under both the
EADCM Regulations and the FEI General Regulations by explicit
endorsement.105  Next, the CAS approved the standing of the Ger-
96. See id. at 12 (describing violation type).  Medication class A is a class of
Prohibited Substances on the Equine Prohibited Substances List. See id.
97. See id. at 16–17 (discussing fairness, welfare, event profile, nature of sub-
stance, negligence, hardship, and no prior violations).
98. See id. (citing both types as crucial to sanctioning decisions).
99. See id. at 16–17 (describing factors weighed by Tribunal).
100. See id. at 17 (detailing fines).  Mr. Ahlmann was fined CHF 2,000 and was
ordered to pay CHF 1500 for the costs of the legal proceedings. Id.
101. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 2 (explaining results of CAS decision).
102. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 24 (upholding NF appeal and increasing
Mr. Ahlmann’s period of ineligibility).
103. For a discussion of the merits of the CAS decision, see infra notes
114–29.
104. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, at para. 10 (noting jurisdiction is justified by
Article 35 of FEI Statues, Article 170.1.3 of FEI General Regulations, Article 12.2 of
EADCM Regulations, Article R47 of CAS Code, and “order of procedure . . . signed
by parties”).
105. See id. para. 12 (explaining standing). See also EADCM Regulations, supra
note 24, art. 12.2, at 26-27 (specifying what parties may appeal decisions to CAS,
including National Federation of athlete whose decision is being appealed); FE´DE´R-
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man NF, citing protection of German NF’s public image and its
inability to participate in Tribunal proceedings as supplemental
grounds for a legitimate appeal.106
  The CAS next consolidated the two appeals, CAS 2008/A/1700,
the German NF v. FEI & Christian Ahlmann and CAS 2008/A/
1710, Christian Ahlmann v. FEI.107  The first appeal before the
CAS, filed by the German NF, requested an extended period of in-
eligibility for Mr. Ahlmann and the shift of cost to the FEI and Mr.
Ahlmann equally.108  The second appeal, filed by Mr. Ahlmann, re-
quested a reduced suspension and the burden of arbitration costs
wholly on the German NF.109
  Additionally, the CAS considered the admissibility of new evi-
dence and new arguments by Mr. Ahlmann.110  First, the CAS re-
jected Mr. Ahlmann’s claim that the CAS may not consider
evidence not presented to the Tribunal.111  Likewise, the CAS re-
jected the FEI’s argument that Mr. Ahlmann’s answer was inadmis-
sible because it contained novel arguments.112  Having established
jurisdiction, standing, and other procedural matters, the CAS pro-
ceeded to the merits of the case.113
ATION EQUESTRE INTERNATIONALE, GENERAL REGULATIONS, art. 165, at 40 (23d ed.
2009) [hereinafter FEI Gen. Regulations], available at https://www.fei.org/sites/
default/files/GENERAL%20REGULATIONS%20%20%20Effective%201%20Janu
ary%202015.pdf (“[A]ppeal may be lodged by any person or body with a legitimate
interest against any [d]ecision made by any person or body authorized under the
Statutes, General Regulations or Sport Rules, provided it is admissible.”). But see
Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 12 (arguing that German NF has no legitimate inter-
est in filing appeal).
106. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 13 (finding German NF standing).
107. See id. para. 14 (noting parties’ unanimous consent and rendering of
single award).
108. See id. para. 5 (requesting relief of increased suspension).
109. See id. para. 6 (requesting relief of decreased suspension and shifting of
costs).
110. See id. paras. 14–15 (discussing two procedural motions).
111. See id. (determining CAS Code “supersedes” EADCM Regulations).  The
CAS has an “unrestricted” scope of review. Id. at 15.  See also Arbitration CAS
2004/A/607, B. v. Int’l Weightlifting Fed’n, award of 6 Dec. 2009, available at http:
//jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/607.pdf; Arbi-
tration CAS 2006/A/1153, WADA v. Portuguese Football Fed. & Nuno Assis Lopes
de Almeida, award of 4 Jan. 2007, available at http://www.adop.pt/media/3064/
TAD%20Nuno%20Assis.pdf (establishing CAS’s ability to decide cases based on
internal organizational rules in addition to whether disciplinary decision was
correct).
112. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 15–16 (explaining CAS Code does not
provide limitations on substance of answers).  Further, the Panel determined that
“Mr. Christian Ahlmann had the right to file an [a]nswer to the [a]ppeal [b]rief of
the German NF containing new argument.” Id. para. 15.
113. See id. paras. 10–16 (discussing jurisdiction, applicable law, admissibility,
standing, joinder, and procedural motions).
15
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2. Merits
  The parties stipulated that Co¨ster’s blood and urine tested posi-
tive for Capsaicin.114  The CAS sought to determine whether the
violation by Mr. Ahlmann was a doping violation or a Medication
Class A violation under EADCM Regulations.115  The German NF
and the FEI argued that the presence of Capsaicin constitutes an
anti-doping violation.116  However, Mr. Ahlmann contended the
positive test is not a violation at all, but rather a Medication Class A
offense.117
a. Strict Liability
  First, the CAS determined that FEI Rules and the disciplinary
system prohibiting particular substances comport with Swiss Law be-
cause strict liability is appropriate in equestrian sport.118  The FEI
Rules support a system in which “the mere presence of a prohibited
substance in the horse’s body constitutes a rule violation regardless
of its concentration . . . .”119  The CAS determined that the “FEI
disciplinary system is indeed compatible with the principles and
statues of Swiss law” because strict liability promotes objectives
“unanimously recognised by sports organisations and government
institutions.”120
114. See id. para. 16 (reporting “undisputed” positive test).
115. See id. (describing three classes of substances under EADCM Regulations:
Doping, Medication class A, and Medication class B).  Medication class B was not at
issue here. Id.
116. See id. (reporting contention of German NF and FEI).
117. See id. (arguing low concentration of Capsaicin in Equi-Block dilutes any
therapeutic effect).
118. See id. paras. 16–18 (citing interests such as fairness, health, breeding
quality, and integrity).  The Panel examined FEI General Regulations and EADCM
Regulations. Id. Mr. Ahlmann argues FEI regulations run afoul of Swiss Cartel
Law; however, this was promptly discredited. Id. para. 18.
119. See id. para. 18.  The EADCM Regulations govern prohibited substances
and medication controls. Id. para. 17. See also Fe´de´ration Equestre Internationale,
Decision of the FEI Tribunal – King-Dye, at 10–11, 2008, available at http://www.fei
.org/system/files/24%20-%20MYTHILUS%20-%20Tribunal%20-%20Decision
%20-%20Final%20-%2022%20Sept%2008.pdf (affirming strict liability in environ-
mental contamination claim).
120. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 18 (listing endorsements of strict liabil-
ity). See also Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1569, Ku¨rten v. FEI, award of 12 Dec. 2008,
available at http://www.centrostudisport.it/PDF/TAS_CAS_ULTIMO/15.pdf CAS
(endorsing strict liability standard); Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1654, B. Alves v. FEI,
award of 6 Mar. 2009, available at http://www.fei.org/system/files/CHUPA%20
CHUP%20-%20Final%20CAS%20decision%20dated%206%20March%202009.pdf
(endorsing strict liability standard).
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b. Capsaicin Effect
  Next, the CAS concluded that Capsaicin, a prohibited substance,
has a hypersensitizing effect and thus must be considered a doping
substance.121  Expert witness testimony by professors and veterinari-
ans explained the two-fold effect of Capsaicin when applied topi-
cally: 1) burning sensation (hypersensitization), and 2)
desensitization (analgesic).122  The Panel stressed that these steps
occur consecutively and are inseparable.123  Accordingly, the Panel
found that the presence of Capsaicin in Co¨ster’s system proves
hypersensitization occurred at some point, constituting a doping vi-
olation under FEI rules.124
  Furthermore, the CAS panel disagreed with the FEI Tribunal
finding that “the FEI has to prove more than the mere existence of
the substance” because this would impose a heavy burden on the
FEI.125  This burden would be exceedingly difficult for the FEI, con-
sidering topical Capsaicin is practically untraceable on the skin.126
  Subsequently, the CAS found the following issues irrelevant under
the strict liability standard: state law, common usage, concentration,
and drug alternatives.127  However, the CAS engaged in a brief dis-
cussion of the less contentious issues, including the conflicting ex-
pert opinions concerning Capsaicin’s benign nature in low
concentrations and its common usage by equestrians.128  Conclud-
ing its deliberation, the CAS dismissed these issues but encouraged
the FEI to harmonize its List of prohibited substances in light of
this discussion of Capsaicin.129
121. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, paras. 18–20 (deciding hypersensitizing effect
of Capsaicin meets doping standard under FEI Rules).  The panel dismissed the
argument that Capsaicin also has a pain relieving effect when applied topically. Id.
122. See id. paras. 18–19 (explaining dual effects of topical Capsaicin applica-
tion).  For a full list of expert witnesses, see Ahlmann, supra note 8, paras. 9–10.
123. See id. para. 19 (describing Capsaicin’s hypersensitizing and subsequent
analgesic effects).
124. See id. (determining doping offense has “effectively occurred”).
125. See id. (quoting FEI Tribunal Decision that would create practically im-
possible standard requiring FEI to prove intent). See also id. (agreeing with FEI
that effect would “make the fight against doping illusory” because competitors
could claim alternative use to avoid violation).
126. See id. (considering practical difficulties of evidentiary burden).  The
Panel also notes the Swedish National Equestrian Team adopted a strict no-compe-
tition rule within ninety-six hours of topical Capsaicin application. Id.
127. See id. para. 20 (determining issues irrelevant in light of strict liability
standard).
128. See id. (considering low concentration of Capsaicin in Equi-Block and
common usage of Capsaicin).
129. See id. (deciding issues irrelevant but expressing concern for harmoniza-
tion of FEI rules regarding Capsaicin).
17
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3. Sanctions
  Finally, the CAS determined the sanction for Mr. Ahlmann’s anti-
doping rule violation.130  Pursuant to the FEI General Regulations,
[t]he CAS has the power to impose the same scale of pen-
alties as the FEI Tribunal . . . .  The CAS may impose more
severe penalties than those imposed in the first instance,
provided they are within the limits of the penalty jurisdic-
tion of the body from which the [a]ppeal to the CAS is
brought.131
The CAS considered a number of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors when determining Mr. Ahlmann’s sanction.132  Ultimately, the
CAS imposed an eight-month period of ineligibility and a fine.133
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: STRICT LIABILITY IS NO DARK HORSE
  In upholding the appeal of the German NF, the CAS focused on
the burden of proof under the List.134  Under FEI rules, there is a
strict liability standard for doping.135  The Tribunal’s determination
that the FEI had to prove “more than the mere existence” of the
substance ultimately prevented the Tribunal from finding a more
serious rule violation.136  In light of the established strict liability
standard in equine sport, the CAS decision illuminates why the Tri-
bunal’s holding was misguided.137  The List requires that a prohib-
ited substance must be “used to hypersensitise or desensitise the
130. See id. at 21 (finding Mr. Ahlmann “guilty of an anti-doping rule
violation”).
131. See FEI Gen. Regulations, supra note 105, art. 162 (outlining authority of
CAS to sanction and impose penalties).
132. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, paras. 21–22 (aggravating: level of competi-
tion, 2004 team medal revocation, image of German NF damage, German NF gen-
eral warnings, lack of consultation) (mitigating: general definitions on prohibited
substances list, admission of mistake).
133. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, paras. 22–23 (explaining eight-month period
of ineligibility is one third of maximum for a doping offense).
134. See id. para. 18–19 (explaining FEI should not have to “demonstrate the
wrongful act itself”). Id. para. 19.
135. See id. para. 18 (confirming strict liability standard).  Strict liability is inte-
gral to protecting integrity in sport. See id. See also supra notes 118–120 and accom-
panying text.
136. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, paras. 10–12 (discussing strict liability and de-
ciding proper rule category).
137. See generally Ahlmann, supra note 8, paras. 104–34 (detailing CAS decision
regarding Mr. Ahlmann); Id. at 19 (rejecting FEI contention that FEI must prove
intent along with presence of prohibited substance).
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limbs or body parts” to constitute a violation.138  The FEI Tribunal
stressed the importance of the List’s wording, emphasizing that the
language gives “no indication. . .that the presence of the substance
already implies the use as a hypersensitizing agent.”139  However,
the Tribunal neglected to consider the practical fact that the mere
presence of the prohibited substance in the horse’s body produces
a hypersensitizing effect (hypersensitization), constituting a rule
violation.140
  Likewise, the CAS found that “at some phase, some part of the
horse’s body had necessarily been hypersensitised . . . .”141  Reading
FEI Rules in light of the strict liability standard, the CAS also indi-
cated a myriad of practical issues with proving intent—concerns un-
answered by the Tribunal.142  Unlike the FEI Tribunal’s standard
requiring proof beyond mere existence, the CAS questioned the
practicability of proving the intent to dope and determined pres-
ence of a prohibited substance is equivalent to a violation.143  As
such, the CAS correctly classified Mr. Ahlmann’s rule violation as
doping by noting that presence of a prohibited substance is indica-
tive of a performance enhancing effect, regardless of intent.144
  Further, a key argument of Mr. Ahlmann that was largely ignored
by the CAS argues that the FEI List is “unclear, misleading and has
not been adapted to scientific and technical progress.”145  Mr.
Ahlmann argued that the illustrative rather than specific nature of
the List creates ambiguity.146  This ambiguity is relevant to the fair-
ness of the application of the strict liability standard to equestrian
138. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 10 (reporting Equine Prohibited
List wording).
139. See id. (describing reasoning).
140. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para 17–18 (explaining presence constitutes
violation). See also supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (describing insepa-
rable, two-fold effect of Capsaicin).
141. Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 17–18.
142. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (detailing practical issues
of proving intent). But see Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 10 (neglecting to
address practical issues of proving intent).
143. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 19 (noting hypersensitization occurred
at some point).  “[S]uch an evidentiary burden would be nearly impossible to
meet.” Id.
144. See id. para. 19 (explaining presence of substance means hypersensitiza-
tion occurred). See also supra notes 121–29 and accompanying text (describing
effect of Capsaicin).
145. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 7 (arguing List is “misleading”). See also
id. para. 16 (calling List “ambiguous and unclear”).
146. See id. (contending List does not properly define doping).
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athletes.147  Unlike the United States Equestrian Federation
(USEF), which “expressly mention[s] Capsaicin among the ‘Forbid-
den substances,’” the FEI List is merely “illustrative.”148  Strength-
ening Mr. Ahlmann’s argument, Capsaicin is “not expressly
mentioned on the FEI Prohibited Substances List.”149
  However, the CAS swiftly rejected this argument by confirming
the endorsement of strict liability in equestrian sport.150  The CAS
found Mr. Ahlmann’s argument unconvincing because the illustra-
tive List focuses on the effect of prohibited substances rather than
providing an inventory of every individual illegal substance.151
While Mr. Ahlmann argued that the List “leave[s] gray areas be-
tween medication and doping and between medication and be-
tween legal and illegal practices,” the CAS properly invoked the
strict liability standard to reject Mr. Ahlmann’s argument.152  If the
CAS had accepted Mr. Ahlmann’s argument that the List was funda-
mentally unfair, the violation would likely have been reduced to a
minor sanction.153
  Overall, the CAS made a proper decision to sanction Mr.
Ahlmann for the doping violation.154  The reasoning reflects
proper application of the strict liability standard required under
FEI regulations.155  However, the CAS erred in ignoring Mr.
Ahlmann’s argument regarding the vagueness of the List.156  The
American horseracing industry, handling its own doping issues, has
implemented a disorderly and disjointed regulatory scheme in the
147. See id. (arguing List is unclear and merely illustrative). See also infra notes
148–49 and accompanying text (describing List).
148. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 15 (describing Drugs and Medi-
cations Guidelines of USEF). See also Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 7 (suggesting
illustrative nature of List is detrimental to athlete’s ability to comply).
149. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 8 (reporting Capsaicin does not appear
on List).
150. See id. para. 18 (confirming strict liability standard). See also supra notes
118–20 (describing strict liability standard).
151. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 7 (citing EADCM Regulations providing
“and other substances with a similar chemical structure or similar biological
effect(s)”).
152. Id. para. 8 (describing gray area); id. para. 18 (supporting strict liability).
153. See id. (describing Mr. Ahlmann’s position that gray areas in rules should
be interpreted in favor of competitor).
154. See supra notes 101–33 and accompanying text (detailing reasons why
CAS made proper decision to sanction Mr. Ahlmann).
155. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (describing strict liability
standard).
156. See supra notes 145–55 and accompanying text (explaining Mr.
Ahlmann’s argument and reasoning for CAS dismissal).
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United States.157  In contrast to the orderly, consistent endorse-
ment of strict liability implemented by the FEI, horseracing is strug-
gling to control doping under its disorderly regulatory scheme.158
  Despite divergent strategies in the fight against doping, both
Olympic equestrian sport and horseracing apply a version of strict
liability.159  However, the CAS failed to acknowledge any alternative
to strict liability, such as a rebuttable presumption rule that exists in
the United States.160  Although the Tribunal waivered momentarily,
it eventually gave proper deference to the strict liability standard set
by the FEI.161
  Unfortunately, neither the Tribunal nor the CAS considered an
alternative to strict liability.162  This approach disregards considera-
tion of an alternative—the rebuttable presumption rule.163  This
rule provides an opportunity for presentation of evidence to refute
a positive test.164  However, in the defending strict liability standard,
the CAS example is illustrative: “any PR could simply declare that
he used the substance for its original—e.g. therapeutic- purposes to
escape any charge of doping.”165  This argument also relates to ap-
plication of the rebuttable presumption rule in doping because the
rebuttable presumption rule would likely allow the person responsi-
ble to escape liability if the substance has multiple effects (doping
and therapeutic).166  The Tribunal and the CAS appropriately de-
clined to consider this rule, or other strict liability alternatives, be-
157. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (detailing thoughts on regula-
tory system). See also supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text for a further discus-
sion of doping and regulatory scheme in the American horseracing arena.
158. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (describing strict liability
standard in equestrian sport).
159. See supra notes 58–62, 118–20 and accompanying text (detailing strict
liability in horseracing and Olympic equestrian sport).
160. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 18 (upholding strict liability and ignor-
ing “unfairness” argument).
161. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 24, at 10–12 (describing strict liability
standard in Olympic equestrian sport).
162. See supra notes 83–133 and accompanying text (detailing the reasoning
of each decision-making body).
163. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing rebuttable pre-
sumption rule in horseracing).  The rebuttable presumption is supported by those
who disfavor the harshness of strict liability. See id.
164. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing application of
rule).
165. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 19 (cautioning against danger of greater
burden than mere existence).
166. See id. (arguing any standard less than strict liability is unacceptable).
The CAS argues that the evidentiary burden proving intent to dope is too high. See
id.  In light of this and the need to protect the integrity of sport, strict liability is
appropriate. See id.
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cause any standard other than strict liability could impose an
impossible evidentiary burden on the FEI.167
VI. IMPACT: STRICT LIABILITY CONFIRMED WITH STABLE PRECEDENT
  The CAS decision in Ahlmann created additional precedent for
upholding the strict liability standard in equestrian sport.168  Much
has changed in the equestrian world since the six doping cases at
the 2008 Summer Games.169  The Clean Sport campaign and its
working committees, launched after the confusion and scandals of
2008, have produced numerous publications, including updated
prohibited substance Lists, EADCM Regulations, and Anti-Doping
Rules for Human and Equine Athletes.170  In the fall of 2010, the
FEI launched both iPhone and Android applications that provide
easy access to the Equine Prohibited Substance List.171
  The FEI praised its Clean Sport campaign in August 2012 after a
clean London Games that summer.172  FEI President, Princess
Haya, remarked that the clean games “demonstrate[d] the success
of the FEI Clean Sport campaign, which has resulted in a major
reduction in the number of positives in the Olympic disciplines
over the past two and a half years.”173  Additionally, the FEI boasted
that the 2012 London games were subject to the most testing of
“any previous Olympic Games.”174
  In a 2014 decision, Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Zayed Al Nahyan v.
FEI,175 the CAS struck down a direct challenge to the strict liability
167. See id. at 19 (explaining evidentiary burden).  For a further discussion of
the evidentiary burden by the Tribunal and the CAS, see supra notes 91–94,
125–126 and accompanying text.
168. See Ahlmann, supra note 8, para. 18 (upholding strict liability). See also
Wendt, supra note 7, at 11–12 (arguing CAS support of strict liability spurred FEI
action).
169. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing 2008 doping cases).
170. See FEI Clean Sport, FEI.ORG, http://www.fei.org/fei/cleansport, (last vis-
ited Sept. 14, 2015) (listing documents produced); Wendt, supra note 7, at 13 (in-
dicating Commission was created in response to 2008 Capsaicin cases).
171. See Official FEI Clean Sport App extended to Android Phones, FEI CLEAN SPORT
CAMPAIGN (Dec. 1, 2010), http://prohibitedsubstancesdatabase.feicleansport.org/
list_news.php?id=24; FEI unveils iPhone App for Equine Prohibited Substances List, FEI
CLEAN SPORT CAMPAIGN (Nov. 1, 2010), http://fei.org/news/fei-unveils-iphone-
app-equine-prohibited-substances-list (describing capabilities of new app).
172. See FEI President Celebrates London 2012 Clean Games in Equestrian Sports,
FEI.ORG (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.fei.org/news/fei-president-celebrates-
london-2012-clean-games-equestrian-sports (reporting success of 2012 games).
173. See supra note 172 (reporting fewer positives).
174. See supra note 172 (describing frequency of testing).
175. Arbitration CAS 2014/A/3591, Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Zayed Al
Nahyan v. FEI, award of 8 June 2015 [hereinafter Al Nahyan], available at http://
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standard in equine sport.176  Rejecting the argument that strict lia-
bility is fundamentally unfair, the CAS affirmed that the standard is
“justified by the public interest against doping in the sport.”177
Moreover, the CAS concluded imposing strict liability is “well within
the margin of appreciation permitted to the FEI in making rules for
the sport.”178
  The recent precedent of Al Nahyan demonstrates the continued
commitment to the strict liability standard in equestrian sport.179
Looking forward, the FEI has announced a January 2016 launch of
a global Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication Programme.180
Aiming to promote education and awareness, the FEI hopes to
“protect horse welfare and maintain a level playing field.”181  How-
ever, the regime is not without critics.182  Strict liability in eques-
trian sport has been challenged in Tribunal hearings and before
the CAS without significant headway.183
  In contrast, one equine sports law practitioner supports flexibility
because of the unique relationship between horse and rider in
equestrian sport.184  Unlike human athletes who have total control
over their own bodies, a rider cannot practically exercise complete
www.fei.org/system/files/Final%20CAS%20Decision%20-%208%20June%202015
_0.pdf (rejecting strict liability challenge).
176. See id. para. 31 (finding strict liability “justified” to prevent doping).  It
should be noted the CAS partially amended the Tribunal’s decision on other
grounds. Id. paras. 32–34.
177. See id. at 30–31 (affirming strict liability). See also Sheikh challenges stand-
ing of FEI’s strict liability principle in anti-doping cases, HORSETALK.COM (June 24, 2015,
5:38 PM), http://horsetalk.co.nz/2015/06/24/sheikh-fei-strict-liability-principle-
anti-doping/#axzz3iRqPRUpX (“The strict liability principle had been a corner-
stone of the FEI’s regulatory framework since 1982.”).
178. See Al Nahyan, supra note 175, para. 31 (describing reasoning).
179. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text (describing CAS uphold-
ing strict liability).
180. See FEI President Pushes Clean Sport Message, EVENTINGCONNECT.COM (Sept.
1, 2015), http://eventingconnect.today/2015/09/01/fei-president-pushes-clean-
sport-message/ (announcing new program).
181. See id. (justifying new, updated rules).
182. See generally Neil Clarkson, Bar Set Too High in FEI Doping Cases, Lawyer
Believes, HORSETALK.COM (Sept. 9, 2014, 6:50 PM), http://horsetalk.co.nz/2014/
09/09/bar-set-too-high-fei-doping-cases-lawyer-believes/#axzz3o1HXWdni (argu-
ing no fault, no negligence standard too burdensome for inadvertent doping). See
also supra notes 175–80 and accompanying text (challenging strict liability
standard).
183. See supra notes 83–133 and accompanying text (detailing one particular
challenge to standard). See also supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text
(describing another failed challenge).
184. See Clarkson, supra note 182 (describing difference between human dop-
ing and equine doping).
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control over his or her mount.185  Accordingly, the attorney advo-
cates a subjective test for inadvertent doping.186  However, riders
would need to prove contamination to utilize this more subjective
and flexible standard of review.187
  Despite occasional protests from equestrian athletes, it seems
strict liability in equine sport is here to stay.188  Although com-
menters and competitors alike have criticized the strict liability stan-
dard, no CAS decision has reconsidered strict liability for doping in
international equestrian sport.189  FEI communication and educa-
tional campaigns have had positive impact in decreasing violations,
with the FEI reporting steady decreases in positive tests under
EADCM Regulations with a yearly increase of horses being
tested.190
  With strict liability as the cornerstone of doping regulation, ac-
countability, health, and safety will remain top priorities.  This sys-
tem encourages disclosure by veterinarians, athletes, grooms, and
others involved in the care of equine athletes.  Even putting aside
health and safety issues, doping in sport compromises the integrity
of the game.  The FEI should be lauded for its efforts to eradicate
equine doping through its Clean Sport campaign and its endorse-
ment of a strict liability standard.  Ultimately, the combination of a
strict liability standard coupled with a rigorous educational cam-
paign is the best way to maintain the integrity of equestrian sport
while protecting both human and equine athletes.
Mary Zoeller*
185. See id. (explaining difference between human doping and equine
doping).
186. See id. (arguing for flexibility in inadvertent doping cases).
187. See id. (advocating for “sliding scale”).
188. See EADCM Regulations, supra note 24, art. 2.1.1 at 1 (containing lan-
guage that creates strict liability standard). See also supra note 44 (describing strict
liability standard for Equine Anti-Doping offenses).
189. For a discussion of the most recent challenge to strict liability in the CAS,
see supra notes 175–82 and accompanying text.
190. See Fe´de´ration Equestre Internationale, REPORT OF THE FEI EQUINE ANTI-
DOPING AND CONTROLLED MEDICATION PROGRAMME 2014 (2014), available at https:/
/www.fei.org/system/files/Annual%20Report%202014.pdf (last visited Oct. 29,
2015) (reporting statistics).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Villanova Charles Widger School of Law; Furman
University, 2014.
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